Border Carbon Mechanism and Metals: Who Pays?

From 1 January 2026, the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) operates in its definitive regime under Regulation (EU) 2023/956: for embedded emissions in imported iron, steel and aluminium, the authorised declarant must report and surrender certificates. This material examines who bears the legal and economic burden, how the mechanism affects pricing, documentation and trade finance terms for metals, and what remains undecided.

Border Carbon Mechanism and Metals: Who Pays?
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by Robert ShilerHead of the Analytics Group

From 1 January 2026, the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) operates in its definitive regime under Regulation (EU) 2023/956: for embedded emissions in imported iron, steel and aluminium, the authorised declarant is obliged to report and surrender certificates in accordance with Articles 6 and 20 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2025/2083.

The first annual declaration for 2026 imports is to be submitted by 30 September 2027 pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2025/2083; the sale of certificates on the single central platform begins on 1 February 2027 pursuant to Article 20 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956.

The certificate price has already been determined for three past quarters: €75.36 for the first quarter of 2026 (published on 7 April), €75.28 for the second quarter (6 July) and €82.32 for the third quarter (published on 5 October). The price is calculated as the weighted average auction price of European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) allowances; in 2026 it is set quarterly, and from 2027 — weekly. Official quotations are published by the European Commission on the European Commission's page with CBAM certificate prices; the methodology is laid down in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2548.

In parallel, in the trilogue negotiations between the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission, according to Agence Europe, the first trilogue on 20 October ended without agreement; the issue under discussion is extending the mechanism to products of further processing of steel and aluminium, as demanded by European industrial associations in a joint statement by 13 industry associations dated 20 October 2026. This changes not only customs and climate reporting, but also pricing, documentation and trade finance terms for metals.

How the mechanism works in the definitive period

The obligated entity is the authorised CBAM declarant — an importer registered in an EU Member State, or an indirect customs representative if it has agreed to perform this role in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956.

The de minimis threshold is 50 tonnes of net mass of CBAM goods per calendar year per importer in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2025/2083. If this limit is exceeded, the obligations automatically extend to the entire annual import volume, including consignments below the threshold; for electricity and hydrogen this exception does not apply, and declaration is mandatory from the first delivery.

The annual declaration states the quantity of goods, embedded emissions and the number of certificates to be surrendered in the CBAM Registry. Emissions are calculated either on the basis of actual installation data verified by an accredited verifier, or on the basis of default values established by the Commission's Implementing Regulation on default values. When default values are used, a deduction of the carbon price is possible only through annual default carbon prices, if officially published.

The authorised declarant submits the first declaration for 2026 by 30 September 2027 pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2025/2083. The sale of certificates begins on 1 February 2027; at the end of each quarter, the declarant's account must hold at least 50% of the certificates corresponding to the embedded emissions of imports since the beginning of the year, taking adjustments into account, as provided for by Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2025/2083, and this requires liquidity planning.

In 2026, the certificate price is determined as the average EU ETS allowance auction price for the quarter; from 2027 — as the average weekly price under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2548. The number of certificates is reduced proportionally to the continuing free allocation of EU ETS allowances within Europe and by the amount of the carbon price actually paid in a third country for the declared emissions, as provided for by Articles 31 and 9 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956.

For importation without authorised declarant status when the threshold is exceeded, a penalty is provided; the consequences of importing goods by a person without authorised declarant status are established by the article of Regulation (EU) 2025/2083 on importation without declarant status, including restriction of further importation until the required status is obtained.

The base penalty for uns surrendered certificates is €100 per tonne of CO₂ with indexation, but in the absence of authorisation it may be increased by the national administration by a factor of 3–5, and also reduced taking into account the nature, duration, repetition of the infringement and the degree of cooperation of the declarant with the competent authority pursuant to Article 26 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956.

Who pays legally and who pays economically

The legal obligation rests with the authorised declarant: the importer in the EU or an indirect customs representative that has assumed the mechanism's obligations. A non-resident producer does not automatically become the declarant; it may supply verified data and support the importer, but does not replace it in relations with the Commission and customs authorities.

The economic burden is distributed differently. Under FCA, FOB or CIF terms, importation into the EU is cleared by the buyer, which becomes the authorised declarant; the seller can compensate it for the expected mechanism costs only through the price, if the parties so agree. Under DDP, importation is cleared by the seller through a representative in the EU, and the mechanism costs, as a rule, fall on the seller. The contract must fix who provides data on the installation and precursors, who bears the risk of changes in the certificate price, and how adjustments following the annual declaration are reimbursed.

Data become a pricing instrument. A producer that transmits verified actual values lowers the buyer's calculated embedded emissions relative to default values and reduces the number of certificates to be surrendered. For a carbon-intensive route this is a direct argument in price competition; the absence of data means that the importer finances uncertainty.

By a conditional calculation, costs are determined by the formula:

(emissions per tonne − 0.975 × benchmark) × certificate price

For illustration, let us take conditional values: 2.0 tonnes of CO₂ per tonne of product for the blast furnace–basic oxygen furnace route and 0.5 tonnes for the electric arc furnace route on scrap; benchmarks — 1.4 and 0.4 tonnes of CO₂ per tonne respectively under the Commission's draft benchmarks for steel; certificate price — €75.36 per tonne of CO₂ for the third quarter of 2026.

Based on actual verified data in 2026, costs will be approximately €47.85 per tonne for the blast furnace–basic oxygen furnace route and €8.29 per tonne for the electric arc furnace route on scrap. In 2034, with a complete phase-out of free allowance allocation and the same certificate price — €45.22 and €7.54 per tonne respectively.

Under default values, taking into account the 20% increase in such values from 2027 provided for by the implementing rules, the calculated burden will be higher; its exact size depends on the country of origin, the commodity code and the production route applied. The calculation is conditional: it does not take into account future allowance price dynamics, the local carbon price and possible changes in benchmarks.

The cost gap between production routes depends on the ratio of actual emissions to the benchmark, as well as on the data applied — actual or default; it is not fixed at all stages of implementation.

What changes in transaction documentation

The producer transmits to the importer not a declaration but the source data for it: identification of the installation, production route, specific direct and indirect emissions, information on precursors used and emission factors applied in accordance with the Commission's guidance for operators of installations outside the EU.

For steel this requires a clear distinction between the blast furnace–basic oxygen furnace route, direct reduced iron with electric arc furnace, and the electric arc furnace route on scrap; for aluminium — primary and secondary processing, energy sources and the composition of the anode mass in accordance with the sectoral annexes to Regulation (EU) 2023/956.

Verification of actual values is carried out by an independent accredited verifier under the EU rules set out on the Commission's page on emissions verification. It confirms the completeness, accuracy and reliability of the installation's reporting on the basis of the Commission's guidance for verifiers of 24 August 2026, but does not guarantee the commercial parameters of the supply and is not responsible for technical errors in the transmission of data between counterparties.

In the contract it is advisable to fix rigidly: the list and format of data, the exact deadline for their transmission before shipment or customs clearance, material liability for inaccuracy, the procedure for updating when emissions are recalculated and the mechanism for price adjustment after the annual declaration. If data are not provided, the importer is entitled to apply the Commission's default values, and the seller in that case completely loses the price advantage of its verified environmental reporting.

Documents on origin intersect with the mechanism's data, especially when verifying the country of smelting and the production route; this interface is disclosed in more detail in our material on EU trade measures and confirmation of the country of smelting. See additionally our materials on hedging steel prices and on the scrap market.

How the mechanism affects cost and financing terms

For the importer, the mechanism creates a deferred payment obligation: certificates are purchased starting from 1 February 2027, and at the end of each quarter at least 50% of certificates must be held against embedded emissions already imported. This creates a need for working capital between payment for the goods, customs clearance and the purchase of certificates; with significant import volumes it may compete with financing of inventories and receivables.

The amount of the obligation at the time of conclusion of the contract is unknown: the certificate price is determined from EU ETS auction data, and the final emissions depend on the producer's verified data and precursors. In credit risk analysis this means the need for a limit or reserve for price and reporting uncertainty, and not only for currency and commodity risk.

For the collateral structure, the risk is documentary in nature: breach of the mechanism's obligations may lead to a penalty and restriction of further importation until authorised declarant status is obtained in accordance with the article of Regulation (EU) 2025/2083 on importation without declarant status. Goods already delivered under a letter of credit or financing against a warehouse receipt retain their value, but future supplies and the borrower's turnover fall under operational risk.

For the exporter, emissions intensity becomes a competitiveness factor: at a comparable metal price, the EU buyer compares not only the FOB price but also the expected mechanism burden. This is particularly noticeable when comparing the blast furnace–basic oxygen furnace and electric arc furnace on scrap production routes using the Commission's default values for steel.

Linking the loan margin to an emissions intensity indicator is possible, but requires a verifiable efficiency indicator and independent verification; this is a logic of analysis rather than established practice in the steel industry.

ECB supervisory expectations require mandatory consideration of climate risks in the credit process, risk appetite and stress tests in accordance with the ECB guide on climate and environmental risks. In turn, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has established the EBA Guidelines on ESG risk management (EBA/GL/2025/01), mandatory from 11 January 2026, defining approaches to their identification, measurement and monitoring within the prudential supervision of credit institutions; for small and non-complex banks it applies from 11 January 2027.

What is still undetermined

The main open parameter is the perimeter of further-processed products. The Commission's proposal COM(2025)989 provides for the addition of about 180 codes, the Council's general approach of 12 June 2026 — about 200, and the European Parliament's position of 15 September 2026 — 457 goods. The first political trilogue took place on 20 October 2026 but did not lead to a common agreement; until agreement and a final vote, the text is not law. European industrial associations are actively calling for the widest possible coverage in order to protect internal value chains.

In parallel, anti-circumvention measures are being discussed: definitions of resource repurposing, criteria for assessing goods and origins with a high risk of abuse, additional reporting requirements. For supply chains this may mean deeper verification not only of the final producer but also of the sources of semi-finished products.

Default values and recognition of foreign carbon prices also remain fluid. From 2027 the Commission will be able to publish annual default carbon prices for third countries in a special mechanism registry; deduction of the carbon price actually paid requires confirmed evidence and strict accounting of benefits, subsidies or direct compensations granted in the country of origin, pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956. In addition, the default emissions values themselves are subject to revision with an increase in the penalty mark-up to 20% from 2027 in accordance with the Commission's Implementing Regulation on default values.

The positions of trading partners remain the subject of acute legal dispute: following a claim by Russia in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, a panel has been established in case DS639 ("EU — Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism"); 18 WTO members, including the United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland, have availed themselves of third-party rights.

For long-term contracts, it is worth monitoring the final list of further-processed products, anti-circumvention criteria, the methodology for default values and the procedure for recognising carbon prices. Each of these decisions can change the price, the document package and the allocation of risk under the mechanism between seller and buyer.

Comparative analysis of contractual approaches
CriterionContract without a mechanism cost clausePassing the cost to the buyer based on actual dataPrice with cost included based on default valuesSeller assumes declarant obligations through an EU representative
Who bears the mechanism costUndetermined; dispute likelyBuyer, based on verified emissionsSeller, in the embedded priceSeller through a representative, then in the price
What data are needed from the producerNot establishedRoute, installation emissions, precursorsMinimal; default values appliedFull package for declaration and verification
Risk for the buyerUncertain price and disputesDependence on the quality of the seller's dataOverpayment at low actual emissionsLimited; risk concentrated with the seller
Risk for the sellerDispute over reimbursement after the declarationRisk of incomplete or erroneous dataLoss of margin if the certificate price risesRegulatory liability and cash gap
Impact on transaction financingUncertainty complicates assessmentTransparent basis for calculating CBAM costsPredictable price, but excessive cost possibleA limit for the representative's obligations is needed

Conclusions

A metals exporter should prepare installation-level data in advance: production route, specific direct and indirect emissions, information on precursors, energy sources and emission factors applied. Verified actual values reduce the buyer's dependence on default values and preserve the price position of the supply.

The cost of the mechanism should be expressly fixed in the contract: determine the payer, the calculation basis, the procedure for transmitting data, price adjustment and the allocation of the risk of growth in the CBAM burden as free allocation of EU ETS allowances is reduced.

The importer needs to provide in working capital for the purchase of certificates from 1 February 2027 and the quarterly requirement to hold at least 50% of certificates. Credit limits should take into account the uncertainty of the price and final emissions.

The material does not forecast certificate prices or the outcome of the legislative process, does not assess EU policy or that of trading partners, is not tax or legal advice and does not assess specific companies and banks.

Frequently asked questions

Who pays for the border carbon mechanism certificates — the exporter or the importer?

Legally, the certificates are purchased and surrendered by the authorised declarant — the importer in the EU or an indirect customs representative that has assumed such obligations. Economically, the costs may be passed on to the exporter through the price, the delivery basis and contractual clauses. The outcome depends not on the regulation but on the agreed allocation of cost and the quality of the emissions data provided.

What happens if the producer does not provide actual emissions data?

The importer is forced to apply the default values established by the Commission. For most carbon-intensive production routes this increases the calculated embedded emissions and the number of certificates to be surrendered. The seller thereby loses the ability to confirm lower emissions intensity and the corresponding price advantage.

Should emissions documents be included in the terms of a letter of credit?

This is possible as a contractual option if the bank agrees to accept such documents as a condition of performance. But there is no stable confirmed practice of including CBAM data in letters of credit yet, and discrepancies between the invoice, the verification and the beneficiary's requirements create a risk of refusal of payment. It is more practical to transmit data outside the documentary settlement and to fix liability for their accuracy in the contract.

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