Tokenization of Metals: What Digital Twins of Inventory Change in the Double-Pledging Problem, and What Remains Outside the Register. Part 2.
Tokenization and digital twins solve the problem of duplicate warehouse receipts, but they do not confirm that the metal actually exists in the warehouse. An analysis of where the register's capabilities end and physical control remains indispensable.


What Remains Outside the Register
A register of encumbrances confirms the uniqueness of a record, not the presence and quality of the metal. Stones in a bag are not detected by any entry in the register, so physical control remains indispensable.
1. Physical substitution. After the 2023 incident, the London Metal Exchange introduced enhanced checks for nickel in bags: the use of magnets and metal detectors, and a touch check to assess the size and shape of the contents. These procedures are a response to the fact that an electronic receipt could not detect substitution.
Weight sensors, video surveillance, labels on packs, remote monitoring of balances, and selective re-assay are used. Each method records a specific parameter and has limits:
a sensor records weight but not composition;
a label verifies the integrity of the packaging but not the contents.
2. Forms of metal, on which depends how easily it can be counted, weighed and checked:
Cathodes (copper, nickel) are packed in bundles or bundles with the manufacturer's marking, batch number and weight. They can be counted piece by piece, each bundle can be weighed and reconciled with documents;
Precious metal bars have individual serial numbers and certificates of analysis;
Nickel in bags is an intermediate form: bags can be weighed, but the contents cannot be counted piece by piece like cathodes. It was precisely this vulnerability that manifested itself in Rotterdam in 2023: the substitution was detected only upon weighing, but visual inspection did not reveal stones inside the bags.
3. Types of storage:
An exchange warehouse licensed by the LME. Metal under warrant is subject to the exchange's rules: requirements for packaging, marking, seals, weighing and inspection procedures;
When stored off-warrant, the metal may be located in the same warehouse but without the issuance of a warrant. The right is confirmed by a warehouse receipt, and the exchange's rules apply partially;
A port or customs warehouse is regulated by the country's customs legislation, not by the exchange. There are no unified packaging and marking standards here, and the risk of substitution or double pledging is higher.
4. Only assay analysis determines the chemical composition of the metal. For example, for nickel the LME requires a manufacturer's certificate of analysis indicating all elements according to the ASTM B39-79 or GB/T 6516-2010 specification (grade Ni9990). If the manufacturer's certificate is unavailable, the analysis is performed by an LME-accredited laboratory (LSA).
Weight tolerances upon receipt and withdrawal of metal are usually ±0.5% of the net weight indicated in the certificate, and for pig iron — up to ±1%. If the discrepancy is within the tolerance, the weight according to the documents is considered final. If it exceeds it, the buyer may file a claim taking this tolerance into account.
5. Reliability of the data source. A digital twin is only as accurate as the data entered by the warehouse operator or a sensor. Who is responsible for the reliability of the input is a separate question that the register does not resolve. For more on data quality — see our other material.
6. Collusion and insolvency of the warehouse operator. In the event of a warehouse bankruptcy, the rights of the receipt holder may compete with the claims of other creditors. In the event of collusion among warehouse employees, substitution is possible even with a register in place.
7. Other jurisdictions. Metal moved to a country where the register is not recognized, or parallel documents issued outside it, remain outside the system.
The allocation of responsibility among the participants in the chain is not obvious and depends on the legal regime, contractual terms and the circumstances of the specific case.
The warehouse operator is liable under the storage contract and the terms of the warehouse agreement. Under LME rules, the warehouse is obliged to compensate for losses associated with the replacement or cancellation of a warrant if they are caused by improper performance of the warehouse's obligations.
However, standard terms often limit liability. In the case of Natixis S.A. v Marex Financial and Access World Logistics (Singapore) Pte Ltd, the High Court of England in 2019 established that the warehouse Access World was liable for negligently certifying forged warehouse warrants to Marex, but not to the bank Natixis. The court found a breach only on two of the five transactions.
The warehouse's liability was limited by standard terms: €100,000 for each certified warrant. The compensation amount was reduced by 25% due to the contributory negligence of Marex itself, which did not send the remaining warrants to the warehouse for verification. This case concerned a Singapore warehouse not connected with the Rotterdam incident of 2023.
The collateral manager is liable within the scope of its functions. If its duty was a physical inspection of the goods and it did not perform it or performed it improperly, liability may fall on it. But if its role was limited to verifying documents, and the substitution occurred at the warehouse, its area of responsibility does not cover the physical presence of the metal.
The insurer covers the risks stipulated by the policy. As a rule, insurance of warehouse inventory covers damage, loss or theft, but the terms may exclude losses from fraud or forgery of documents.
The liability of the register operator depends on the rules of the specific system. For the LME's electronic warrant transfer system (LMEsword), the rules expressly provide: the depositary is not liable for the formation and accuracy of reports generated by the LMEsword system, nor for its operation and effectiveness.
For other registers — including national receipt registration systems and private blockchain platforms — the scope of the operator's liability is determined by their own rules, and there is no single standard here. For example, for the Chinese register or the Singapore accreditation system, no analogous public rules on limiting the operator's liability were found in the sources reviewed.
Practical conclusion: in the event of metal substitution, as a rule, in the structures reviewed the risk falls on the receipt holder if it has not ensured an independent physical inspection and has not insured the corresponding risk. The warehouse operator's liability is limited by contractual terms, insurance coverage depends on the policy, and the register operator is in most cases protected from claims.
Requirements for a Working System
1. Legal priority of the register and its binding force for all documents on a lot. Without this, the register remains an additional tool rather than a replacement for paper: it protects only those who use it and does not close the loophole for parallel documents outside the system.
2. Licensing of warehouses and their property liability for shortfalls. According to London Metal Exchange notice 26/059 of 4 March 2026, the operator PAC Global Services Spain was fined £250,000. The most serious violation identified was the storage of metal under 62 copper warrants on an open site outside the LME-approved warehouse in Kaohsiung (Taiwan). The exchange qualified this as a "flagrant violation" of the warehouse agreement.
3. Physical inspection regime: upon receipt, upon registration of the document, upon withdrawal, and selectively during the storage period. Exchange inspectors conduct their own selective checks in parallel with the warehouses.
4. Independent audit of inventory and register data, assay analysis.
5. Insurance of warehouse inventory and operator liability covers part of the losses but does not replace physical control.
6. Different requirements for lot identification depending on the form of metal:
precious metal bars have serial numbers;
lots of base metals are often depersonalized.
The LBMA bar integrity database, launched in January 2025, collects data at the level of an individual bar. The platform is built on distributed ledger technology: a digital twin with a history of origin and storage is created for each bar.
| Control method | What it confirms | Protection against double pledging | Protection against metal substitution | Legal status of the record | Main vulnerability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Paper receipt with inspections | Right to the goods at the warehouse | Absent outside the creditor's records | Depends on the frequency of inspections | Determined by contract and law | Segregated accounting, warehouse collusion |
| Electronic exchange warrant | Right within the exchange system | Within the exchange system | Requires physical procedures | Determined by exchange participants | Does not cover off-exchange storage |
| State register of receipts | Uniqueness of the record and encumbrances | Within the register | Does not confirm the presence of metal | Depends on recognition in the legal order | Parallel documents outside the system |
| Token with a digital twin | Transferable representation of a right | Depends on the design and the register | Requires verification of the data source | Determined by the law of the token | Reliability of the operator's data |
Conclusions
A bank accepting metal with a digital twin or token should verify the legal status of the register in the applicable jurisdiction: whether a record in it is recognized as determinative for the priority of the pledge.
The register closes the double-pledging risk provided that it is binding for all documents on a given lot and that the metal cannot be parallelly documented outside the system.
Physical inspections remain mandatory at any depth of digitalization: the register does not detect metal substitution, does not confirm quality and does not replace inspection. Digital accounting removes the problem of multiple records but not the problem of the reliability of the data entered into it.
This material does not evaluate specific exchanges, warehouses, platforms or companies and is not a recommendation on accepting collateral.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can tokenization fully eliminate double pledging of the same lot of metal?
Within a system where the register has legal priority and is binding for all documents, double pledging is technically impossible. If parallel paper documents retain force or the metal can be documented outside the system, the protection is incomplete.
Why did electronic exchange warrants not prevent the substitution of nickel in the warehouse?
An electronic warrant confirms the holder's right to the metal within the exchange system. It does not confirm that the contents of the bags correspond to what is declared. Substitution is detected by physical inspection, not by a record.
What should a bank check when accepting tokenized metal as collateral?
In addition to the record itself: the legal status of the register in the applicable jurisdiction, the binding force of the register for all documents on the lot, the physical inspection regime upon receipt and during the storage period, the liability of the warehouse operator and the availability of insurance.


