Growth of the Derivatives Market for Tokenized Assets

At the current stage of development of the digital asset market, there is a growing number of platforms providing access to derivatives on tokenized equities and commodities. The functionality of these venues includes the ability to use borrowed capital to execute transactions with the specified derivatives, which allows market participants to apply risk management strategies typical of the traditional financial sector within the decentralized finance environment.

According to a CoinGecko report, the aggregate trading turnover of RWA perpetuals in the first quarter of 2026 reached $524.79 billion (perimeter — perpetual futures linked to prices of equities, ETFs, and commodities, margin trading with leverage). This figure has already exceeded the total volume of the entire 2025 ($313.02 billion), while the quarterly dynamics demonstrate acceleration: from $29.74 billion in Q1 2025 to $138.87 billion in Q4 2025.

Notably, according to the aggregator The Block, the trading volume of RWA perpetuals in June 2026 amounted to approximately 470 billion dollars, which demonstrates a discrepancy in estimates between different data providers that use different counting methodologies and lists of venues taken into account.

What exactly is being traded?

On crypto exchanges under the label "tokenized stocks/bonds/commodities," two different classes of instruments are in fact circulating, and the rights of the holder, risks, and legal nature of the position depend on this distinction.

Tokenized security vs derivative contract

A tokenized security (RWA token) is a digital token representing a claim to an underlying asset (stock, bond, fund share, etc.), secured by it directly or through a trust structure/custodian depending on the legal construction of the issuer. The holder of such a token in an ideal model has an economic interest similar to owning the security itself and may potentially claim the rights associated with it (dividends, coupons, participation in corporate events) — provided that the token issuer and infrastructure provide for and perform this.

A derivative contract (TradFi perp / synthetic token) is a derivative that merely references the price of the underlying asset but does not grant rights to the asset itself. The holder of a position in such a contract does not own the stock/bond/commodity but has an obligation/claim to the counterparty (exchange, protocol, liquidity pool) depending on the price movement. There is no underlying asset "behind the token" in the legal sense.

Absence of corporate rights for the perpetual holder

Hence the absence of corporate rights for the perpetual holder: dividends, voting rights, or priority satisfaction of claims. Certain venues imitate dividends through the funding rate mechanism: short positions pay long positions an amount equivalent to the payout on the "ex-dividend" date.

However, such compensation is a transfer between traders in most cases; some platforms use separate cash-adjustments at the expense of their own reserves, rather than a payout from the issuer. Legally, it does not create a claim against the company that issued the shares. The processing of corporate events (splits, stock dividends) is carried out by individual venues through adjustment of the position size and entry price. This allows preserving the aggregate value and PnL of the position.

During adjustment periods, trading is suspended, unexecuted orders are canceled, and funding fee accrual is frozen. The risks of a price gap at the moment of transition to a new reference are borne by the protocol, not by the issuer of the asset.

To whom the claim of the position holder is directed

The claim of the position holder is directed not to the issuer but to the smart contract or protocol. Depending on the architecture, the insolvency risk is covered either by the exchange's balance sheet or by an insurance fund with an auto-deleveraging (ADL) mechanism.

In the event of platform bankruptcy, the perpetual holder acts as an unsecured creditor with respect to the margin balance. The right to compensation is determined by the platform's terms and its jurisdiction, not by the corporate law of the asset's issuer.

The commodity leg

The commodity leg demonstrates an analogous construction. Perpetuals on gold, oil, or gas provide synthetic exposure to prices without physical delivery and without rights to warehouse storage.

Unlike traditional futures, there is no expiration and no settlement against real metal or a barrel. The contract references the quotes of the corresponding futures or spot prices depending on the platform's specification and does not imply ownership rights to the commodity. The entire economic interest of the holder in this case is exhausted by the price movement of the selected benchmark.

Regulatory perimeter

A perpetual contract on a tokenized financial instrument (stock, ETF, commodity) is qualified as a derivative, not as a crypto-asset within the meaning of MiCA, PSA (Singapore), or analogous laws on digital assets. The reason: the economic essence of a perpetual is an agreement to exchange the price difference without physical delivery of the underlying asset, with settlement in fiat or stablecoin and periodic payments (funding rate), which corresponds to the definition of a contract for difference (CFD) or a swap.

In the EU, ESMA on February 24, 2026, explicitly stated that the commercial name "perpetual future" does not affect classification under MiFID II: if an instrument provides leveraged access to an underlying asset without exclusive physical delivery, it likely falls under product intervention measures for CFDs, however firms are obliged to conduct a thorough legal analysis of each product to confirm qualification.

Product intervention measures are contained in Articles 40–42 of MiFIR (Regulation (EU) No 600/2014), and not in Annex I Section C MiFID II (this is a list of financial instruments). The MiCA regime (Regulation (EU) 2023/1114) excludes derivatives from its perimeter (Art. 2(4)(a)), therefore perpetuals on tokenized stocks/commodities are regulated not as crypto-assets but as financial instruments under MiFID II.

In the US, according to historical CFTC practice, perpetual contracts were equated to swaps under CEA §1a(47). However, in May 2026, the CFTC made a regulatory reversal, officially classifying crypto perpetuals as futures, permitting their listing on DCM venues (which is currently being contested: the CFTC filed a motion to dismiss, CME's objections must be submitted by October 2, 2026; case: Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc. v. Michael S. Selig and Commodity Futures Trading Commission, No. 1:26-cv-02157 (D.D.C. 2026)). At the same time, perpetuals on traditional tokenized stocks and ETFs in the US are qualified as Security-Based Swaps and come under strict SEC oversight, rather than CFTC, fully excluding the application of spot digital asset norms to them.

In Singapore, MAS classifies perpetual futures on crypto-assets as DPT-derivatives, available only to accredited investors within the framework of the Securities and Futures Act (SFA), prohibiting the provision of leverage to retail persons. In Hong Kong, the SFC, according to guidance from February 2026, requires an analogous analysis of product qualification.

Restrictions for retail investors

Key jurisdictions have introduced strict limits on the offering of margin derivatives to non-professional clients. Let us consider a number of examples:

Access and territorial restrictions

Venues restrict access from certain jurisdictions through IP geoblocking, KYC verification by passport/residency, and blocking of fiat gateways for prohibited countries. This means that the declared trading volumes may include traffic from jurisdictions where the product is formally unavailable to retail (offshore routing), which inflates the estimate of real regulated demand. For example, European retail clients can use offshore versions of platforms (Bermuda, Seychelles), where leverage limits reach 50–125x, but such volumes are not counted in the statistics of regulated EU venues.

Requirements for trading infrastructure

Organizers of derivatives trading in the EU (MiFID II, Article 23) are obliged to ensure price transparency, pre- and post-trade reporting, as well as the use of a central counterparty (CCP) for clearing OTC derivatives (EMIR, Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, Article 4). In the US, the CFTC requires registration of venues as DCM (Designated Contract Market) or SEF (Swap Execution Facility) with mandatory clearing through a DCO (Derivatives Clearing Organization) under CEA §2(h).

The model without a CCP (decentralized perpetuals on DEX) does not meet these requirements: settlements occur through smart contracts without a central counterparty, which excludes such venues from the perimeter of regulated infrastructure in the EU and the US. In this regard, the volumes of DEX perpetuals are not included in the official statistics of regulated derivatives, and their legal status remains uncertain in most jurisdictions.

Institutional demand: verification of the thesis

Institutional participation is hindered by requirements for asset custody (MiFID II custody, CFTC Part 30), mandate restrictions on derivatives without a CCP (EMIR, Dodd-Frank), the absence of a central counterparty on DEX, and difficulties with reporting (AIFMD, Form CPO-PQR). Banking regulators (OSFI, Basel) prescribe increased capital requirements for counterparty risk on derivatives on crypto-assets (Group 2a), making such positions economically inefficient.

The data do not confirm the thesis of a mass inflow of institutional capital: the structure of volumes shows the dominance of retail and proprietary traders. According to a Futures of Work study (July 2026), 94% of the volume on traditional commodity futures is generated by institutional hedgers, whereas perpetuals are oriented toward retail, which constitutes only 5% of long positions in CFTC reports. There are no public statements by managers (BlackRock, Fidelity, Vanguard) about participation in RWA perpetuals.

Professional market makers (Wintermute, GSR, Cumberland) are present as liquidity providers, but this is not equivalent to institutional allocation demand. Market makers earn on the spread and rebate without taking on long-term market risks, whereas institutional allocators (pension funds, insurance companies) allocate capital in accordance with mandates and risk management requirements.

In the absence of public disclosures (13F, Form N-PX) on positions in RWA perpetuals, the thesis of an inflow of institutional capital is not confirmed by data. Regulatory initiatives of the CFTC (Coinbase, Kalshi, May 2026) create a path for institutional access through FCM and CCP, but the products are limited to crypto-based assets (BTC, ETH), and not tokenized stocks/commodities.

Conclusions

1. Due diligence on infrastructure. When evaluating a venue, it is necessary to request: (a) the list of price sources (oracles/feeds), the switching mechanism in case of failure, and the history of discrepancies between the mark price and the market; (b) the procedure for covering losses upon liquidations — the size of the insurance fund, the criteria for triggering auto-deleveraging (ADL), and the order of satisfaction of holders' claims in case of a deficit.

2. Valuation of a position ≠ ownership of the asset. The perpetual holder has no rights to dividends, voting, or property of the issuer. The economic result is determined exclusively by the price movement of the benchmark, and corporate events (splits, dividends) are processed through technical adjustments of the position, and not through direct payouts. This is synthetic exposure, not substitute ownership.

3. Unavailability for the regulated investor. Participation is impossible under mandates requiring: custody of assets through a regulated custodian (MiFID II, CFTC Part 30), clearing through a central counterparty (EMIR, Dodd-Frank), and disclosure of positions (13F, AIFMD). Banking standards (Basel III) prescribe increased capital for counterparty risk on crypto-derivatives, making positions economically inefficient. The product remains outside the perimeter for pension and insurance funds in the EU and the US.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

How does a position in a perpetual contract on a tokenized stock differ from owning the stock itself?

A position in a perpetual is a derivative contract for the price difference without physical delivery, not granting shareholder rights (voting, dividends). Economic exposure is provided through the funding rate, and not actual ownership of the security. In the event of platform bankruptcy, the investor remains a creditor without a direct claim to the underlying asset. The regulatory regime differs: perpetuals are qualified as CFDs/swaps (MiFID II, CFTC), and not as securities.

What happens to the contract's pricing during hours when the underlying market is closed?

Perpetuals trade 24/7, while underlying stocks trade only during NYSE/NASDAQ hours. During non-working hours, the price is formed by supply and demand on the venue with a link to the index price, which can lead to deviations (premium/discount). The funding rate corrects these deviations, forcing long positions to pay shorts (or vice versa). When the underlying market opens, the price usually converges, but gaps are possible due to overnight news.

Who bears the loss if the venue's insurance fund is exhausted during cascading liquidations?

In the model without a CCP, losses are distributed among counterparties through auto-deleveraging (ADL) or socialization of losses. Profitable positions may be partially closed to cover the losses of liquidated positions. On regulated venues with a CCP, the clearing house covers losses through margin requirements and a default fund, but such products are currently limited to crypto-based assets. Investors must take into account counterparty risk, since the protection of funds without a CCP is not guaranteed.