Scrap Derivatives and Financing: How the Growth of Electric Arc Furnace Steelmaking and Hedging Instruments Open Structured Trade Finance to the Scrap Market. Part 2.
As electric arc furnace steelmaking expands, scrap becomes a strategic raw material. But can derivatives and hedging tools unlock structured trade finance for the scrap chain — and what still stands in the way?


The Scrap Chain and the Need for Financing
Working capital needs arise at the following stages:
1. Collection and procurement. Scrap sources are dispersed: industrial offcuts, end-of-life vehicles, building demolition, household metal. Collectors buy from many small suppliers, so settlement is usually immediate or on a short timeline — there is no payment deferral, as is common, for example, in mechanical engineering. Read more about this in another article on our blog.
Scrap collection is subject to seasonal fluctuations. In winter, construction sites halt and logistics become more difficult — inflow falls and purchase prices rise slightly. In spring and summer, collection grows, but prices peak due to increased demand.
For an exporter, this means uneven yard inventory throughout the year. For a bank, seasonality means that collateral valuation in different months relies on a different physical volume.
2. Processing and yard storage. Scrap is sorted, cut, baled or shredded. It is stored in bulk, not counted piece by piece, and this directly affects how a bank can control the collateral. A collateral manager at the yard can confirm only the total volume and visually assess composition, but not the exact grade and weight.
This means collateral control relies on periodic inspections and the borrower's own records, rather than on continuous and precise identification of each lot.
3. Consolidation of a sea shipment. The exporter collects scrap from several yards and collectors to form a lot for vessel loading. Assembling it takes time: scrap accumulates at yards until the required volume is reached. During this period, money has already been invested in procurement, but the goods have not yet been sold. The scrap must then be transported from the yards to the port, which involves separate costs before shipment.
4. Transportation and settlement with the mill. At the mill, payment is based on weight and grade determined at acceptance. Terms depend on the contract, but a gap arises between shipment and receipt of funds for the exporter.
The standard settlement structure is 30% prepayment by telegraphic transfer + 70% irrevocable letter of credit at sight. The prepayment covers pre-shipment costs, and the letter of credit ensures payment after document presentation. For Turkish mills, letters of credit with 30–90 day terms are typical. For a bank, this means: under a letter of credit, the source of repayment is tied to the issuing bank, not to the buyer.
The greatest funding need is that of the processing exporter, which is simultaneously engaged in scrap processing and export. As a scrap processor, it buys scrap from collectors and small suppliers, sorts, cuts, bales or shreds it at its yard, then forms an export lot and sells it to a mill abroad.
In the scrap chain, this is the middle link between collectors and the mill:
collectors have no access to the export market and no capacity to prepare a lot;
mills do not work directly with many small suppliers.
The processing exporter bridges this gap: it both processes scrap and sells it abroad. Such a company:
pays suppliers immediately;
bears the costs of processing, storage and logistics to the port;
Receives payment from the mill only after shipment and acceptance.
Until the mill pays, the exporter must settle with suppliers and cover processing and logistics costs. This is where the working capital need is greatest.
Scrap Hedging Instruments and Their Liquidity
The scrap derivatives market consists of several contracts whose liquidity is significantly lower than that of non-ferrous metals.
1. LME Turkish scrap contract. The London Metal Exchange futures contract is settled against the Platts assessment, with Turkish imported heavy melt scrap as the underlying asset.
2. CME contracts. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange offers two contracts:
HMS 80/20 CFR Turkey — for Turkish imported scrap, aimed at steelmakers and scrap traders;
Chicago No.1 Busheling — for US Midwest scrap.
However, the use of these instruments has many limitations.
Futures trading volumes for scrap are not comparable in size to contracts for non-ferrous metals. A correct comparison should be made on average daily volume (ADV) over the same period.
According to LME data for January–May 2025, trading volume in Turkish scrap contracts amounted to about 63 thousand lots, while open interest in the nearest contract was only 3 thousand lots. For comparison:
open interest in copper reached 430 thousand lots per day in December 2025;
average daily volume in aluminium exceeded 268 thousand lots per day.
For scrap, there is no data on average daily trading volume in open sources. It is known that the HMS 80/20 CFR Turkey contract trades on CME with a contract size of 10 metric tonnes, and open interest in the nearest contract in May 2026 was only 6 contracts as of May 2026.
This is equivalent to 60 metric tonnes, illustrating the extremely low liquidity of the instrument. For CME, there is no comparable data on average daily volume for scrap contracts in open sources.
This means that a physical participant attempting to open a position may face liquidity constraints and wide spreads. Basis risk: the hedging instrument and the participant's own price risk do not coincide. For example, the Turkish contract protects the export market but not domestic scrap prices in India, China or Europe.
For a participant outside the Turkish market, the mismatch arises across three parameters at once — grade, region and market. As a result, the hedge protects the wrong price.
Price risk for copper and aluminium scrap is partially covered by primary metal contracts, but the risk of changes in the scrap-to-primary-metal discount remains. This discount depends on processor demand, scrap quality and logistics, and is not covered by primary metal contracts.
There is no public data on the share of physical participants (processors, traders, mills) in scrap contracts. LME does not disclose the breakdown by participant type for the Steel Scrap CFR Turkey contract. Industry publications note that the contract is used by "physical traders, end consumers, banks and market makers," and that with growing liquidity in 2024–2025, hedge funds and CTAs joined trading. However, these sources do not provide a specific share of physical participants.
The thesis that the instrument is used specifically by those hedging physical scrap relies on qualitative assessments by market participants rather than disclosed exchange statistics.
What Prevents Banks from Accepting Scrap as Collateral
Obstacles to using scrap as collateral lie in valuation, control and risk.
1. Valuation complexity. There are many scrap grades — heavy melt, shredded, busheling, offcuts — and their prices vary widely. Even within a single grade, contamination levels and metallic yield differ, depending on impurities, moisture and alloying elements.
Non-metallic inclusions and water mean that yard weight does not equal the weight of metal that can actually be recovered. Valuation depends heavily on inspection, and its results change when the cargo is moved.
2. Control problems. Scrap lies in bulk — it cannot be tagged and counted piece by piece, like ingots or cathodes. Cargo moves between yards and lots are mixed. A collateral manager on site can confirm that "a pile of scrap is present," but cannot precisely verify whether the scrap grade and quantity match what is recorded in the collateral documents.
3. Information asymmetry and fraud risk. Typical industry risks:
grade inflation — low-grade scrap is declared as high-grade to obtain a higher valuation;
contamination — adding non-metallic materials to increase weight;
shortfall — less collateralized scrap than stated in the documents.
4. Regulatory risk. Scrap processing yards require environmental permits and waste handling licenses. Export rules may change — for example, the EU is promoting restrictions on scrap exports. Changes in regulation directly affect whether collateral can be realized and how reliable export contracts are.
5. Radiation control is mandatory at scrap acceptance. Contamination sources enter scrap in two ways: natural (NORM) and artificial (cobalt-60, caesium-137). The most dangerous are sealed sources: when they enter a furnace, they contaminate the entire steel batch.
Large warehouses and mills control incoming scrap; small yards may not have detectors. Stationary monitors detect gamma radiation but may fail if the source is shielded or distributed in the cargo. For a bank, the absence of radiation control at the yard is an additional collateral risk.
6. Price information. Scrap has no continuous and highly liquid public price, unlike non-ferrous metals. Valuation relies on price agencies such as Platts, but the frequency and representativeness of these assessments are limited — this complicates daily collateral revaluation.
7. Counterparties. The upper part of the chain consists of small and opaque collectors with a short financial history. It is difficult for a bank to assess their creditworthiness.
How Hedging and Deal Structure Open Access to Financing
1. Financing against hedged inventory. The borrower provides the bank with a scrap inventory as collateral and simultaneously hedges price risk. The hedge separates price fluctuations from financing risk, so the bank can reduce the price component of the discount.
However, the discount for grade, contamination and yield remains: the bank still finances not the entire weight at the yard, but only the estimated metallic yield. The hedge does not cover the risk that the declared grade does not match the actual one or that impurity content is higher than expected.
Condition for application: a liquid contract is needed that matches the grade and region of the inventory. If basis risk is large, the hedge does not fully eliminate price uncertainty, and the bank retains an additional discount.
Let us make an illustrative calculation. Suppose the metal inventory is 1,000 tonnes; price is $350 per tonne; metallic yield is 85%; the bank's discount is 30% without a hedge and 20% with a hedge.
Value adjusted for yield: 1,000 × 0.85 × $350 = $297,500. The difference from the documentary value ($350,000) is the value of impurities that the bank does not finance.
base without hedge: $297,500 × 0.70 = **$208,250;
base with hedge: $297,500 × 0.80 = **$238,000;
hedge effect: +$29,750 (+14.3%).
If the price falls by 10% (to $315): value — $267,750. Base without hedge — $187,425, with hedge — $214,200.
Conclusion: the hedge reduces only the price component of the discount. The discount for grade and contamination remains — the bank finances not the entire weight at the yard, but the estimated metallic yield.
2. Pre-export financing of a sea shipment of scrap. Based on the export contract with the mill, financing covers the cycle from scrap procurement to shipment. Funds are repaid from receivables under the contract, and cash flow is controlled through a proceeds collection account.
Condition: the contract permits assignment of receivables, and the buyer's credit quality is acceptable.
3. Structured financing against the mill's letter of credit. If the mill pays under a letter of credit, it becomes the underlying asset of the financing. It can be obtained by the consolidator, who then advances suppliers. Such a structure transfers the bank's risk from the scrap inventory to the credit quality of the issuing bank: it is the issuing bank, not the mill, that bears the payment obligation to the beneficiary when documents comply with the letter of credit terms.
Until proper documents are presented, performance risk on the part of the exporter remains — if the exporter does not ship the goods or does not prepare documents in accordance with the letter of credit terms, payment will not be made. Thus, the financier's risk is distributed between the issuing bank and the exporter, rather than between the mill and the bank.
4. Collateral management. When financing against scrap inventory, an independent collateral manager regularly inspects the yard: confirms inventory presence, assesses grade distribution, and reconciles records of inflow and outflow. But due to the physical properties of scrap, the frequency and accuracy of such inspections are limited.
Limitations: even with hedging instruments available, small collectors and some processors may remain outside structured financing. They are too small for the minimum threshold, their financial statements are insufficient for credit assessment, and the location and grades of their inventory cannot be effectively controlled.
Scrap Derivatives and Financing: How the Growth of Electric Arc Furnace Steelmaking and Hedging Instruments Open Structured Trade Finance to the Scrap Market. Part 2.

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| Structure | Repayment basis | Scrap valuation requirements | Role of hedging | Main risk of the financier | Applicability to small processors |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revolving financing without scrap collateral | Borrower's overall creditworthiness | No direct requirements | Not applied | Borrower credit risk | Requires stable reporting |
| Financing against inventory without hedging | Realization of scrap inventory | High: grade, weight, impurities | Absent | Price decline and valuation errors | Limited by valuation capabilities |
| Financing against hedged inventory | Value of inventory after hedging | High: same | Reduces price risk | Basis risk and control failure | Requires a suitable contract |
| Pre-export financing of a sea shipment | Receivables under the contract | Medium: pre-shipment inspection | Optional: contract price | Buyer credit and performance risk | Requires an acceptable contract |
Conclusions
For a processing scrap exporter to access financing against inventory, it must first build:
inventory accounting by grade with registration of inflow and outflow;
an inspection procedure verifiable by a third party;
a traceable history of settlements with suppliers.
When assessing scrap collateral, a bank looks not at how many tonnes are available, but at how many tonnes can be reliably valued and controlled.
Scrap hedging at the current level of liquidity is not useful for everyone:
large processors and traders working in the Turkish export market can use LME or CME contracts to manage price risk;
for domestic market processors, basis risk may outweigh the benefit of hedging.
Appropriateness depends on how large the risk is, how liquid the contract is, and how predictable the basis is.
Exporters of sea shipments have access to pre-export financing under an export contract and discounting under the mill's letter of credit. General requirements:
the buyer's credit quality can be assessed;
the contract permits assignment of receivables;
cash flow is controlled.
The material does not forecast scrap prices, does not evaluate specific exchanges, banks or companies, and is not a recommendation on transactions with derivative instruments or on structuring financing.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Can the price of scrap in the domestic market be hedged with a contract for imports into Turkey?
The Turkish contract is settled against the import price into Turkey and differs from the domestic market price in terms of region, logistics and supply-demand balance. The basis between them may be significant and unpredictable. If basis risk exceeds the price risk itself, the hedging effect is limited.
Why is a bank reluctant to accept scrap as collateral if there is an exchange price?
The exchange price reflects a standardized product of a specific grade and delivery location, whereas the collateralized scrap is actual bulk cargo, mixed by grade and requiring on-site valuation. The bank's key question is whether the grade and quantity stated in the documents match the actual inventory. The complexity of valuation and control, rather than the price itself, is the main obstacle.
How do scrap export restrictions affect exporter financing?
Restrictive measures directly affect the legality and enforceability of export contracts. If scrap cannot be exported as planned, the source of repayment for financing based on the export contract disappears. When assessing such financing, a bank must confirm export licensing requirements, the specific scope of restrictions and their effective date.


